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Abstract
We characterize scal and monetary policy in a monetary union with the potential
for rollover crises in sovereign debt markets. Member-country scal authorities lack
commitment to repay their debt and choose scal policy independently. A common
monetary authority chooses ination for the union, also without commitment. We
rst describe the existence of a scal externality that arises in the presence of lim-
ited commitment and leads countries to over borrow; this externality rationalizes the
imposition of debt ceilings in a monetary union. We then investigate the impact of
the composition of debt in a monetary union, that is the fraction of high-debt versus
low-debt members, on the occurrence of self-fullling debt crises. We demonstrate that
a high-debt country may be less vulnerable to crises and have higher welfare when it
belongs to a union with an intermediate mix of high- and low-debt members, than one
where all other members are low-debt. This contrasts with the conventional wisdom
that all countries should prefer a union with low-debt members, as such a union can
credibly deliver low ination. These ndings shed new light on the criteria for an
optimal currency area in the presence of rollover crises.
We thank Cristina Arellano, Enrique Mendoza, Tommaso Monacelli, and seminar participants at several
places for useful comments. We also thank Ben Hebert for excellent research assistance.
11 Introduction
Monetary unions like the euro zone are characterized by centralized monetary policy and
decentralized scal policy. The on going crisis in the euro zone highlights the well known
problems associated with stabilizing asymmetric shocks with a common monetary policy.
These problems have been studied in depth starting with the seminal work of Mundell
(1961) on optimal currency areas. The crisis however has brought to the forefront a much
less understood phenomena of the consequences of heterogenous sovereign debt positions in
a monetary union on monetary policy and the conicts that can arise. For instance there is
signicant disagreement among euro zone members on how to confront the sovereign debt
crisis in high-debt countries. Countries like Germany are concerned about the scal and
inationary consequences of the ECB's promise to purchase sovereign debt of periphery
economies in the event of a crisis. On the other hand, crisis economies like Spain, Portugal,
Ireland and Greece argue that a lender of last resort is required to remove or mitigate the
threat of a self-fullling rollover crisis.1 In this paper we shed light on these under studied
issues. We introduce a framework that allows us to address the role of uncoordinated scal
policy but centralized monetary policy in nominal debt dynamics and exposure to self-
fullling debt crises.2 Our ndings shed new light on the criteria for an optimal currency
area in the presence of debt crises.3
The environment consists of individual scal authorities that choose how much to con-
sume and borrow by issuing nominal bonds. A common monetary authority chooses ination
for the union, taking as given the scal policy of its member countries. Both scal and mon-
etary policy is implemented without commitment. The lack of commitment on scal policy
raises the possibility of default. The lack of commitment on monetary policy makes the
central bank vulnerable to the temptation to inate away the real value of its members'
nominal debt. In choosing the optimal policy ex post, the monetary authority trades o the
distortionary costs of ination against the scal benets of debt reduction. Lenders recognize
this temptation and charge a higher nominal interest rate ex ante, making ex post ination
1De Grauwe (2011) emphasizes the importance of the lender of last resort role for the ECB.
2Araujo et al. (2012) consider some implications of currency denomination of debt in the presence of
self-fullling crisis. Dixit and Lambertini (2001) and Dixit and Lambertini (2003) examine the implications
for output and ination in a monetary union where scal policy is decentralized and monetary policy is
centralized, allowing for the authorities to have conicting goals for output and ination. Cooper et al.
(2009) and Cooper et al. (2010) examine the interaction between scal and monetary policy in a monetary
union including exploring the incentives for a monetary bailout in the presence of regional debt. There exists
an important literature jointly analyzing scal and monetary policies in a monetary union in the presence of
New Keynesian frictions such as for example Beetsma and Jensen (2005), Gali and Monacelli (2008), Ferrero
(2009) and Farhi and Werning (2013). The focus of our paper diers from this literature as it is on debt,
ination and crises.
3For a survey on optimal currency areas see Silva and Tenreyro (2010).
2self defeating.4
The joint lack of commitment and coordination gives rise to a scal externality in a mon-
etary union. The monetary authority's incentive to inate depends on the aggregate value of
debt in the union. Each country in the union ignores the impact of its borrowing decisions
on the evolution of aggregate debt and hence on ination. We compare this to the case of a
small open economy where the scal and monetary authority coordinate on decisions while
maintaining the assumption of limited commitment. We show that a monetary union leads
to higher debt, higher long-run ination and lower welfare. While coordination eliminates
the scal externality, it does not replicate the full-commitment outcome. We show that full
commitment in monetary policy gives rise to the rst best level of welfare, with or without
coordination on scal policy. These two cases allow us to decompose the welfare losses in
the monetary union due to lack of coordination versus lack of commitment.5 The presence
of this scal externality rationalizes the imposition of debt ceilings in a monetary union.6
In this context of debt overhang onto monetary policy, we explore the composition of
the monetary union. In particular, we consider a union comprised of high- and low-debt
economies, where the groups dier by the level of debt at the start of the monetary union.
Consider rst the case without rollover crises, that is there is no coordination failure among
lenders in rolling over maturing debt. While ination is designed to alleviate the real debt
burden of the members, all members, regardless of debt levels, would like to be part of a low-
debt monetary union. This is because in a high-debt monetary union the common monetary
authority is tempted to inate to provide debt relief ex post but the lenders anticipate this
and the higher ination is priced into interest rates ex ante. Consequently, the members
in a union obtain no debt relief and only incur the dead weight cost of ination. A low-
debt monetary union therefore better approximates the full-commitment allocation of low
ination and correspondingly low nominal interest rates. High-debt members recognize they
will roll over their nominal bonds at a lower interest rate in such a union, thereby beneting
from joining a low-debt monetary union. This agreement on membership criteria however
does not survive the possibility of rollover crises.
In particular, we consider equilibria in which lenders fail to coordinate on rolling over
4Barro and Gordon (1983) in a seminal paper demonstrate the time inconsistency of monetary policy and
the resulting inationary bias.
5Chari and Kehoe (2007) describe the roll of commitment in eliminating the scal externality in a mone-
tary union. We demonstrate the separate role of coordination and of commitment in aecting ination, debt
dynamics and welfare in a monetary union.
6Debt ceilings on member countries are a feature of the Stability and Growth pact in the eurozone.
Similarly debt ceilings exist on individual states in the U.S. Von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996) provide
evidence of debt constraints on sub-national governments in a large number of countries, each of which
works like a monetary union. Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) provide an argument for debt ceilings in a monetary
union that arise from political economy constraints, namely short-sighted governments.
3maturing debt. This opens the door to self-fullling debt crises for members with high
enough debt levels. In this environment, there is a trade o regarding membership criteria.
As in the no-crisis benchmark, a low-debt union can credibly promise low ination, which
leads to low nominal interest rates and low distortions. However, in the presence of rollover
crises monetary policy not only should deliver low ination in tranquil times but also serve
as a lender of last resort to address (and potentially eliminate) coordination failures among
lenders. The monetary authority of a union comprised mainly of low-debtors may be un-
willing to inate in the event of a crisis, as such ination benets only the highly indebted
members at the expense of higher ination in all members. That is, while low-debt member-
ship provides commitment to deliver low ination in good times, it undermines the central
banks credibility to act as lender of last resort. Therefore, highly indebted economies prefer
a monetary union in which a sizeable fraction of members also have high debt, balancing
commitment to low ination against commitment to act as a lender of last resort.
Importantly, the credibility to inate in response to a crisis (an o-equilibrium promise)
may eliminate a self-fullling crisis without the need to inate in equilibrium. This is remi-
niscent of the events in the summer of 2012 when the announcement by the ECB president
Mario Draghi to defend the euro at all costs sharply reduced the borrowing costs for Spain,
Italy, Portugal, Greece and Ireland. This put the brakes on what arguably looked like a self-
fullling debt crises in the euro zone, without the ECB having to buy any distress country
debt.7
One way to interpret these ndings is to consider the decision of an indebted country to
join a monetary union or to have independent control over its monetary policy. In the absence
of rollover crises the country is best served by joining a monetary union with low aggregate
debt, as in such a union the monetary authority will deliver low ination. This is the classic
argument for joining a union with a monetary authority that has greater credibility to keep
ination low.8 By contrast, in the presence of self-fullling roll-over crises, the country can
be better o by joining a monetary union with intermediate level of aggregate debt, as this
reduces its vulnerability to self-fullling crises compared to a union with low aggregate debt.
Importantly, ination credibility can be inuenced endogenously through the debt com-
position of the monetary union. These ndings shed new light on the criteria for an optimal
currency area and relates to the literature on institutional design for monetary policy. Rogo
7An alternative strategy would be for the core countries to promise scal transfers to the periphery in the
event of the crisis. The political economy constraints on engineering such transfers and the weak credibility
of such promises make the ECB intervention more practical and credible, which is why we focus on the latter.
8Alesina and Barro (2002) highlight the benets of joining a currency union whose monetary authority
has greater commitment to keeping ination low in an environment where Keynesian price stickiness provides
an incentive for monetary authorities to inate ex post.
4(1985) highlighted the virtues of delegating monetary authority to a central banker whose
objective function can dier from society's, so as to gain ination credibility. Implement-
ing such delegation however may be diculty if society disagrees with the central banker's
objectives. Here we demonstrate how debt characteristics of monetary union members en-
dogenously impacts the ination credibility of the monetary authority.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model in an envi-
ronment without roll-over crises. It characterizes the scal externality in a monetary union.
Section 3 analyzes the case with roll-over crises. Section 5 discusses the implications for
the optimal composition of a union an indebted country is considering joining and Section
6 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Environment
There is a measure-one continuum of small open economies, indexed by i 2 [0;1], that form
a monetary union. Fiscal policy is determined independently at the country-level, while
monetary policy is chosen by a single monetary authority. In this section we consider the
case where economies are not subject to roll-over risk, that is lenders can commit to roll-over
debt. We introduce rollover risk in section 3.
Time is continuous and there is a single traded consumption good with a world price
normalized to one. Each economy is endowed with yi = y units of the good each period
that is assumed to be constant. The local currency price at time t is denoted Pt = P(t) =
P(0)e
 t
0 (t)dt, where (t) denotes the rate of ination at time t.9 The domestic-currency
price level is the same across member countries and its evolution is controlled by the central
monetary authority.10
Preferences Each scal authority has preferences over paths for consumption and ination
given by:
U
f =
 1
0
e
 t (u(ci(t))    ((t)))dt: (Uf)
9As we shall see, we assume that the monetary authority's policy selects (t)    < 1, and so the
domestic price level is a continuous function of time. Moreover, we treat the initial price level P(0) as
a primitive of the environment, which avoids complications arising from a large devaluation in the initial
period.
10For evidence of convergence in euro area ination rates and price levels see Lopez and Papell (2012) and
Rogers (2001).
5Utility over consumption satises the usual conditions, u0 > 0;u00 < 0, limc#0 u0(c) = 1.
As the scal authority controls ci(t), u(c) is the relevant portion of the objective function
in terms of scal choices. The second term,  ((t)) reects the preferences of the scal
authority in each country over the ination choices made by the central monetary authority.
This term captures in reduced form the distortionary costs of ination borne by the individual
countries. For tractability purposes we assume  ((t))   0(t) and we restrict the choice
of ination to the interval  2 [0;  ].
The monetary authority preferences are an equally-weighted aggregate:
U
m =
 1
0
e
 t

i
u(ci(t))di    ((t))

dt: (Um)
Bond Markets Each country i can issue a non-contingent nominal bond that must be
continuously rolled over. Denote Bi(t) the outstanding stock of country i's debt, the real
value of which is denoted bi(t) 
Bi(t)
P(t) . We normalize the price of a bond to one in local
currency and clear the market by allowing the equilibrium nominal interest rate ri(t) to
adjust. Denoting country i's consumption by ci(t), the evolution of nominal and real debt
is given by:
_ Bi(t) = P(t)(ci(t)   y) + ri(t)Bi(t)
_ bi(t) = ci(t)   y + (ri(t)   (t))bi(t);
where the second line uses the identity _ b(t)=b(t) = _ B(t)=B(t)   (t).
Fiscal authorities cannot commit to repay loans. At any moment, a scal authority can
default and pay zero. If it defaults, it is punished by permanent loss of access to international
debt markets plus a loss to output given by the parameter . We assume that when an
individual country makes the decision to default it is not excluded from the union. We let
V represent the continuation value after a default.
V =
u((1   )y)

 
 1
0
e
 t ((t))dt: (1)
Note that the default payo depends on currency-wide ination, but does not depend on the
amount of debt prior to default.
Bonds are purchased by risk-neutral lenders who behave competitively and have an op-
portunity cost of funds r? = . We ignore the resource constraint of lenders as a group by
assuming that the monetary union is small in world nancial markets (although each country
is a large player in terms of its own debt). In particular, we assume that country i's bond
6market clears as long as the expected real return is r?.
2.2 Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium
We are interested in the equilibrium of the game between competitive lenders, individual
scal authorities, and a centralized monetary authority. In particular, we construct a Markov
perfect equilibrium in which each member country behaves symmetrically in terms of policy
functions. The payo-relevant state variables are the outstanding amounts of nominal debt
issued by member countries. We can substitute the real value of debt under the assumption
that P(0) is given; that is, the monetary authority cannot erase all nominal liabilities at the
start of time with a discrete devaluation of the price level. This is similar to bounding the
initial capital levy in a canonical Ramsey taxation program.11
In general, the aggregate state is the distribution of bonds across all members of the
monetary union. We are interested in environments in which members dier in their debt
stocks, allowing us to explore potential disagreement among members regarding policy and
the optimal composition of the monetary union. On the other hand, tractability requires
limiting the dimension of the state variable. To this end, we consider a union comprised
of high and low debt countries in the initial period. Let  2 (0;1] denote the measure of
high-debt economies, and denote this group H and the low-debt group L. For tractability,
we assume that there is no within-group heterogeneity; that is, bi(0) = bH(0) for all i 2 H
and bj(0) = bL(0) for all j 2 L, with bH(0) > bL(0).
We focus on equilibria with symmetric policy functions, and so the initial within-group
symmetry is preserved in equilibrium. It is useful to introduce the following notation. Let
b(t)H = 1


i2H bi(t)di denote the mean debt stock of the high-debt group, and similarly
b(t)L = 1
1 

i2L bi(t)di denote the debt stock of the low-debt group. Let b = (bH;bL)
denote the vector of mean debt stocks in the two subgroups of members.
Using this notation, the relevant state variable for an individual scal authority is the
triplet (b;bH;bL) = (b;b), where the rst argument is the country's own debt level and the
latter characterizes the aggregate state. Let C(b;b) denote the optimal policy function for
the representative scal authority in the symmetric equilibrium. The monetary authority's
policy function is denoted (b), where we incorporate in the notation that monetary policy
is driven by aggregate states alone and does not respond to idiosyncratic deviations from
the symmetric equilibrium.
11This also speaks to the dierences between our environment and the \scal theory of the price level."
In that literature, the initial price level adjusts to ensure that real liabilities equal a given discounted stream
of scal surpluses. In our environment, we take the initial price level as given and solve for the equilibrium
path of scal surpluses and ination.
7The individual scal authority faces an equilibrium interest rate schedule denoted r(b;b).
The interest rate depends on the rst argument via the risk of default and the latter two
arguments via anticipated ination. In the current environment we abstract from rollover
crises and focus on perfect-foresight equilibria. Lenders will not purchase bonds if default
is perfectly anticipated, and thus scal authorities will have debt correspondingly rationed.
From the lender's perspective, the real return on government bonds absent default is r(b;b) 
(b), which must equal r? in equilibrium.12 In the deterministic case, there is no interest
rate that supports bond purchases if the government will default. Let  
  [0;1) denote the
endogenous domain of debt stocks that can be issued in equilibrium.13
Each scal authority takes the ination policy function of the monetary authority (b)
as given, as well as the consumption policy functions of the other members of the union,
which we distinguish using a tilde, ~ C(b;b). Given an initial state (b;b) 2  
3 and facing an
interest rate schedule r(b) and domain 
, the scal authority with initial debt b 2 
 solves
the problem:
V (b;b) = max
c(t)
 1
0
e
 t (u(c(t))    0(b(t)))dt; (P1)
subject to
_ b(t) = c(t)   y + (r(b(t))   (b(t)))b(t) with b(0) = b
_ bj(t) = ~ C(bj(t);b(t))   y + (r(b(t))   (b(t)))bj(t); for j = H;L
b(t) 2  
;t  0:
Note that this problem is written under the premise the government does not default. This
will be the case for any domain  
 that is sustainable in equilibrium.
The monetary authority sets ination (t) in every period without commitment. The
decision of the monetary authority can be represented by a sequence problem where the
12To expand on this break-even condition, consider a bond purchased in period t that matures in period
t+m and carries a xed interest rate rt = r(b(t);b(t)). The nominal return of this bond is ertm. Equilibrium
requires that the real return per unit time is r?:

Pe(t + m)
P(t)

ertm = er
?m;
where superscript e denotes equilibrium expectations. Taking logs of both sides, dividing by m, letting
m ! 0, and using the denition that e(t) = limm#0
lnP
e(t+m) lnP(t)
m , gives the condition rt = r?   e(t).
In equilibrium, e(t) = (bH(t);bL(t)), which gives the expression in the text.
13More specically, let D(b;b) denote the default policy function, with D(b;b) = 1 if the scal authority
defaults and zero otherwise. The additive separability in U implies that the equilibrium default decision
of an idiosyncratic scal authority is independent of ination, and hence aggregate debt. Therefore,  
 =
fbjD(b;b) = 0g does not depend on the aggregate states. The restriction that b  0 is not restrictive in our
environment, as no scal authority has an incentive to accumulate net foreign assets.
8monetary authority takes the interest rate function r(bH;bL) and the representative scal
authority's consumption function C(b;b) as a primitive of the environment. For any debt
level (bH;bL) 2 

2
the monetary authority solves the following problem:
J(b) = (P2)
max
(t)2[0; ]
 1
0
e
 t [u(C(bH(t);bH(t);bL(t))) + (1   )u(C(bL(t);bH(t);bL(t)))
  0(t))]dt;
subject to
_ bj(t) = C(bj(t);b(t)) + (r(b(t))   (t))bj(t)   y
with bj(0) = bj for j = H;L:
Note that the monetary authority takes the equilibrium interest rate schedule r(b) as given.
From the lenders' break-even constraint, we have that r(b) = r?+e, where e is the lenders'
expectation of ination. In this sense the monetary authority is solving its problem taking
inationary expectations as a given. This is why the solution to the sequence problem P2
is time consistent; the monetary authority is not directly manipulating inationary expec-
tations with its choice of ination. In equilibrium, e = (b), but this equivalence is not
incorporated into the monetary authority's problem as the central bank cannot credibly ma-
nipulate market expectations. This contrasts with the full-commitment Ramsey problem in
which the monetary authority commits to a path of ination at time zero and thereby selects
market expectations. The solution to that problem is to set  = 0 every period.
Before discussing the solution to the problem of the scal and monetary authorities, we
dene our equilibrium concept as follows.
Denition 1. A symmetric Recursive Competitive Equilibrium (RCE) is an interest rate
schedule r; a scal authority value function V and associated policy function C; and a
monetary authority value function J and associated policy function , such that:
(i) V is the value function for the solution to the scal authority's problem (P1) and C
is the associated policy function when Problem (P1) satises the consistency condition
~ C = C;
(ii) J is the value function for the solution to the monetary authority's problem and  is
the associated policy function for ination;
(iii) Bond holders break even: r(b) = r? + (b);
9(iv) V (b;b)  V for all (b;b) 2 

3
.
The last condition imposes that default is never optimal in equilibrium. In the absence of
rollover risk, there is no uncertainty and any default would be inconsistent with the lender's
break-even requirement. As we shall see, this condition imposes a restriction on the domain
of equilibrium debt levels. It also ensures that problem (P1), which presumes no default, is
consistent with equilibrium. That is, by construction the constraint b(t) 2  
 in (P1) ensures
that the government would never exercise its option to default in any equilibrium.
Equilibrium Allocations As  = r?, a natural starting point for characterizing the equi-
librium is that scal authorities would like to maintain a constant level of consumption and
stationary debt. Of course, this conjecture must be veried given that scal policy is imple-
mented with nominal bonds rather than real bonds. To this end, we conjecture and verify
that stationary debt is an equilibrium.
Consider the problem of the scal authority when r satises the equilibrium condition
r(b)   (b) = r? = . As b is beyond the control of an individual scal authority, we
can substitute this condition into Problem (P1), and, focusing on the part of the objective
function that is relevant for the scal authority, consider the simple consumption-savings
problem:
max
c(t)
 1
0
e
 tu(c(t))dt;
subject to _ b(t) = c(t)   y + b(t). For b(0) 2 
, the solution to this problem is constant
consumption; that is, C(b;b) = y   b for all (b;b) 2 

3
. As this policy is followed for all
level of debt, _ b(t) = _ bH(t) = _ bL(t) = 0. The associated value function for (b;b) 2 

3
is
therefore:
V (b;b) =
u(y   b)

   0
 1
0
e
 t(b(t))dt
=
u(y   b)    0(b)

;
which is conditional on the ination policy function of the monetary authority.
The equilibrium domain  
 can be determined from the condition:
V (b;b)  V ;
10which can be rewritten as
u(y   b)    0(b)


u((1   )y)    0(b)

;
or
b 
y

:
Therefore, 
 =
h
0;
y

i
. Note that this outcome veries the conjecture that 
 is indepen-
dent of aggregate states.
Turning to the monetary authority, faced with the above scal policy functions its prob-
lem becomes:
J(b) = max
(t)2[0; ]
 1
0
e
 t [u(y   bH(t)) + (1   )u(y   bL(t))    0(t))]dt;
subject to
_ bj(t) = C(bj(t);bH(t);bL(t)) + (r(b(t))   (t))bj(t)   y;
= [r(b(t))   (t)   ]bj(t); j = H;L;
where the second line of the constraint substitutes C(b;) = y   b.
The solution to this problem satises the recursive Bellman equation:
J(b) = max
2[0; ]
u(y   b)    0 + (r(b)      )rJ(bH;bL)  b
0;
wherever rJ(b) = (JH;JL) =

@J
@bH; @J
@bL

exists. The rst order condition with respect to 
yields:
(b) =
8
> <
> :
0 if  0 >  rJ(b)  b0;
2 [0;  ] if  0 = rJ(b)  b0;
  if  0 <  rJ(b)  b0:
(2)
The inequalities that determine whether ination is zero, maximal, or intermediate, have a
natural interpretation. The marginal disutility of ination is  0. The gain from ination is
a reduction in real debt levels conditional on consumption. This reduction is proportional
to the level of debt, and is translated into utility units via the terms rJ = (JH;JL).
Conditional on the optimal ination policy, as well as the equilibrium behavior of lenders
11and the scal authorities, the monetary authority's value function is:
J(b) =
u(y   bH) + (1   )u(y   bL)    0(b)

: (3)
For b such that r(b) =

@
@bH; @
@bL

exists, this implies
  rJ(b) =
"
u0(y   bH)
(1   )u0(y   bL)
#
+
 0

r(b): (4)
We can construct an equilibrium by nding a pair (J(b;(b)) that satises (2) and (3).
There are many such pairs. The multiplicity arises because the monetary authority takes
the nominal interest rate function r(b) as given and chooses (b) as its best response.
Correspondingly, lenders set r(b) based on the monetary authority's policy function. There
may be many pairs of functions that are best-response pairs.
One natural property is for the equilibrium to be monotonic, i.e. that (b) (and equiv-
alently r(b)) be weakly increasing in each argument. From (4), monotonicity implies that
 rJ(b)  b  u
0(y   bH)bH + (1   )u
0(y   bL)bL:
From (2), if the right hand side is strictly greater than  0, then optimal ination is   in any
monotone equilibrium. It is useful to dene the locus of points that denes this region. In
particular, for each bL 2 
, let the cuto b(bL) be dened by:
u
0(y   b)b + (1   )u
0(y   bL)bL =  0: (5)
Note that the concavity of u implies that b is a well dened function and strictly decreasing
in bL. We thus have:
Lemma 1. In any monotone equilibrium, (b) =   for b 2 

2
such that bH > b(bL).
As ination is a deadweight loss in a perfect-foresight equilibrium, the best case scenario
in a monotone equilibrium is for  = 0 on the complement of this set. Doing so is Pareto
ecient in the sense that lenders are indierent and both scal and monetary authorities
prefer equilibria with lower ination. In particular, we have:
Lemma 2. The best (Pareto ecient) monotone equilibrium has (b) = 0 for b 2 

2
such
that bH  b(bL).
Not all monotone equilibria are characterized by a simple threshold that separates zero
and maximal ination. In particular, it is possible to construct monotone equilibrium with
12(b) 2 (0;  ) for a non-trivial domain of b. These equilibria, however, are Pareto dominated
by the threshold equilibrium.
We collect the above in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Dene b(bL) from equation (5) and 
 =
h
0;
y

i
. The following is the best
monotone equilibrium: For all (b;b) 2 

3
:
(i) Consumption policy functions:
C(b;b) = u(y   b);
(ii) Ination policy function:
(b) =
8
<
:
0 if bH  b(bL);
  if bH > b(bL);
(iii) Interest rate schedule:
r(b) =
(
r? if bH  b(bL);
r? +   if bH > b(bL);
(iv) Value functions:
V (b;b) =
(
u(y b)
 if bH  b(bL);
u(y b)  0 
 if bH > b(bL);
and J(b) = V (bH;b) + (1   )V (bL;b).
The best monotone equilibrium is graphically depicted in gure 1. We do so for a given bL
and let bH vary along the horizontal axis. Given the symmetry of the environment, diagrams
holding bH constant and varying bL have similar shapes, but with thresholds dened by the
inverse of b.
A prominent feature of this equilibrium is the discontinuity in the value functions at b.
A small decrease in debt in the neighborhood above b leads to a discrete jump in welfare.
The lack of coordination between scal and monetary authorities prevents the currency union
from exploiting this opportunity. We now discuss this \scal externality" in greater detail.
For expositional ease, we do so in the case of homogenous debt levels ( = 1). We then
return to the case of heterogeneity to explore the extent of disagreement about policy and
composition of the monetary union.
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Figure 1: Solution in the Monetary Union with No Crisis
2.3 Fiscal externalities in a monetary union
In this subsection, we assume all members of the monetary union have the same level of
debt. In particular, we set η = 1, let b denote bH and let bπ denote the solution to (5) when
η = 1 (that is, u0(y − ρbπ)bπ = ψ0).
The equilibrium described in Proposition 1 reﬂects the combination of lack of commitment
and lack of coordination. With full commitment, the monetary authority would commit to
zero inﬂation in every period.14 In this equilibrium, nominal interest rates would equal r?.
This generates the same level of consumption, but strictly higher utility for b > bπ. This is
the Ramsey allocation depicted in ﬁgure 2, in which V = u(y − ρb)/ρ for all b. The ﬁgure
also depicts the allocation of Proposition 1, which is denoted “MU” for monetary union.
Clearly, the Ramsey allocation strictly dominates the monetary union case in the region of
high inﬂation.
This point is reminiscent of the result in Chari and Kehoe (2007), which compares mon-
14It could also use commitment to rule out default and borrow above χy/ρ, but would have no incentive
to do so.
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2.3 Fiscal externalities in a monetary union
In this subsection, we assume all members of the monetary union have the same level of
debt. In particular, we set  = 1, let b denote bH and let b denote the solution to (5) when
 = 1 (that is, u0(y   b)b =  0).
The equilibrium described in Proposition 1 reects the combination of lack of commitment
and lack of coordination. With full commitment, the monetary authority would commit to
zero ination in every period.14 In this equilibrium, nominal interest rates would equal r?.
This generates the same level of consumption, but strictly higher utility for b > b. This is
the Ramsey allocation depicted in gure 2, in which V = u(y   b)= for all b. The gure
also depicts the allocation of Proposition 1, which is denoted \MU" for monetary union.
Clearly, the Ramsey allocation strictly dominates the monetary union case in the region of
high ination.
This point is reminiscent of the result in Chari and Kehoe (2007), which compares mon-
14It could also use commitment to rule out default and borrow above y=, but would have no incentive
to do so.
14etary unions in which the monetary authority has full commitment versus one that lacks
commitment. This comparison is enriched by considering the role of coordination in an
environment of limited commitment, a point to which we now turn.
Absent commitment, the members of the monetary union cannot achieve the Ramsey out-
come at higher levels of debt. However, they may be able to do better than the benchmark
allocation by coordinating monetary and scal policy, even under limited commitment. As
noted above, the discontinuity in the value function at b represents an unexploited oppor-
tunity for a small amount of savings to generate a discrete gain in welfare. With coordinated
scal and monetary policy, the optimal policy under limited commitment would be to reduce
debt in the neighborhood above b. Specically, coordination makes the monetary union
a scal union as well, and we can consider the entire region a small open economy (SOE)
that faces a world real interest rate r?. This environment is characterized in detail in Aguiar
et al. (2012). Here we simply sketch the equilibrium so as to compare it to the solution of
the monetary union (MU) and refer the reader to the paper for the details of the derivation.
Specically, we consider the same threshold equilibrium dened in Proposition 1.15 In
particular, consider an interest rate schedule r(b) dened on 
 which equals r? for b  b
and r? +   for b > b. We now sketch how the centralized scal and monetary authority
responds to this schedule, and verify that it is indeed an equilibrium. We then contrast the
resulting allocation with that depicted in gure 1.
Faced with this schedule, the unied \SOE" government solves the following problem:
VE(b) = max
f(t)2[0; ];c(t)g
 1
0
e
 t(u(c(b(t))    (t))dt; (P3)
subject to
_ b(t) = c(t) + (r(b(t))   (t))b(t)   y; b(0) = b and b(t) 2 
;
where the subscript E refers to the value for a small open economy. Unlike the problem in
the monetary union, scal and monetary policies are determined jointly in P3. Therefore
the impact of debt choices on ination is internalized by the single authority.
At points where the value function is dierentiable, the Bellman equation is given by,
VE(b) = max
(t)2[0; ];c(t)
n
u(c)    0 + V
0
E(b)(c   y + (r(b)   )b)
o
: (6)
15There are other coordinated SOE equilibria. See Aguiar et al. (2012) for details.
15The rst order conditions are:
u
0(c) =  V
0
E(b);
 =
8
<
:
0 if  0   V
0
E(b)b = u0(c)b
  if  0 < u0(c)b:
The rst condition is the familiar envelope condition that equates marginal utility of con-
sumption to the marginal disutility of another unit of debt. However, such a condition is
not satised by the monetary authority's value function in the uncoordinated equilibrium,
as seen in equation (4). In the coordinated case, there is no disagreement between monetary
and scal authorities regarding the cost of another unit of debt. In particular, this provides
the incentive for the scal authority to reduce debt in the neighborhood above b in the
coordinated equilibrium.
In the region b 2 [0;b], the SOE, like the benchmark, faces an interest rate of r? and
nds it optimal to set c = y   b and  = 0. The consumption is optimal as the rate
of time preference equals the interest rate and the latter is optimal as {by denition {
 0  u0(y   b)b for b  b. Thus  = 0 satises the rst order condition for ination on
this domain.
The distinction between a SOE and the benchmark MU allocation becomes apparent
in the neighborhood above b. We start with the allocation at b. At this debt level,
VE = u(y   b)=, which is the value achieved in the MU equilibrium. As in the MU
economy, in the neighborhood above b, a small open economy cannot credibly deliver zero
ination, as  0 < u0(y   b) for b > b. However, by saving it can do better than the MU
allocation. Specically, the SOE chooses CE(b) < y b, where CE denotes the consumption
policy function of the coordinated scal policy, and thus _ b(t) < 0. At this consumption,
 0 > u0(CE), and so the associated ination remains E(b) =  , validating the jump in the
equilibrium interest rate.
In the neighborhood above b, the SOE can achieve the value V (b) by saving a small
amount. That is, the SOE value function will be continuous at b. As noted above, the
monetary union keeps debt constant in this neighborhood as the idiosyncratic scal authori-
ties do not internalize this potential jump in welfare from a small decrease in aggregate debt.
There is no such externality in the coordinated case.
The precise level of consumption in the neighborhood above b can be determined by
substituting in the envelope condition into (6) and using continuity of VE. In particular,
16dene cE 2 (0;y   b) as the solution to:
u(y   b) = u(cE)    0    u
0(cE)(cE   y + b):
This consumption level satises the Bellman equation in the neighborhood above b. In
this neighborhood, debt is declining and the economy approaches b from above. Along this
trajectory, there is no incentive for the government to tilt consumption as its eective real
interest rate is . That is, CE(b) = cE < y   b = CE(b) on a domain (b;b), where the
upper bound on this domain is given by y   cE = b, the debt level at which cE no longer
generates b0(t) < 0. For debt above b, the government prefers not to save towards b as the
length of time required to reach this threshold is prohibitive.
Collecting the above points, we can characterize the SOE allocation, which is depicted
in gure 2 alongside the benchmark \MU" and Ramsey economies. For b  b, the SOE,
Ramsey, and MU economies are identical. For b > b, the SOE and MU economies are
likewise identical, as the SOE economy nds it optimal to set _ b(t) = 0 despite having high
ination, as in the benchmark. However, there is a dierence for b 2 (b;b). Continuity at
b places the SOE value function strictly above the MU case; however, limited commitment
places SOE strictly below the Ramsey welfare. More specically, from the envelope condition,
the SOE's at consumption policy function (panel b) is associated with a constant V 0
E(b);
that is, VE is linear on (b;b). Moreover, this value function is continuous, and thus the
line connects the MU value function at b to the MU value at b. This line lies strictly above
the MU value function on this domain, representing the welfare loss MU experiences from
lack of coordination, but strictly below Ramsey, representing the welfare loss due to limited
commitment.
The presence of scal externalities rationalizes the imposition of debt ceilings in a mon-
etary union. They can be designed to correct the incentives of individual scal authorities
and implement the SOE outcome in a monetary union by simply imposing b(t)  bSOE
t . Of
course the problem is that it is dicult to make such debt ceilings credible in the face of
ex-post challenges|as illustrated by the repeated violations of the Stability and Growth
pact in the eurozone.
2.4 Heterogeneity absent Crises
We conclude this section by discussing to what extent heterogeneity in debt positions creates
disagreement within a monetary union. We are particularly interested in the question of
whether existing members disagree about the debt choices of other members (or potential
new members). The answer to this question in the current environment contrasts with
17V
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the answer when rollover crises are possible in equilibrium, and so the discussion in this
subsection sets the stage for a key result of the next section.
18To do so, we consider  2 (0;1), where recall that  is the measure of high-debt members
that enter with bH > bL. From the value functions dened in Proposition 1, all members
benet from a higher b. From the denition of this threshold in equation (5), note that all
else equal, b is decreasing in  if b(bL) > bL. This is the relevant domain as otherwise,
even low debtors have high enough debt to induce maximal ination. This implies that even
high-debt members would like to see the fraction of low-debt members increase. Although
high-debt members trigger high ination ex post, they would like ex ante commitment to
low ination at the time they roll over their debt, which happens every period. This is
accomplished by membership in a low-debt monetary union. In fact, for bL < b(bL), the
Ramsey allocation is implemented as  ! 0. There is also no disagreement among the
heterogeneous members that this is welfare improving. The result that high-debt countries
benet by joining a low-debt monetary union is not necessarily true when we introduce
rollover crises, the focus of the next section.
3 Rollover Crises
We now enrich our setup to allow for rollover crises dened as a situation where lenders
may refuse to roll over debt. This can generate default in equilibrium, unlike the analysis of
section 2. The distinction between high and low debtors will be a central focus of the analysis.
As in the no-crisis equilibrium from the previous section, in the equilibrium described below,
countries that start with low enough debt have no debt dynamics; as we shall see, this is
no longer the case for high debtors. To simplify the exposition, we set bL = 0 and drop bL
from the notation, as this state variable is always static in the equilibria under consideration.
That is b = bH is sucient to characterize the aggregate state in the equilibria described
below.
To introduce rollover crises, we follow Cole and Kehoe (2000) and consider coordination
failures among creditors. That is, we construct equilibria in which there is no default if
lenders roll over outstanding bonds, but there is default if lenders do not roll over debt. In
continuous time with instantaneous bonds, failure to roll over outstanding bonds implies a
stock of debt must be repaid with an endowment ow. To allow some notion of maturity
in a tractable manner, we follow Aguiar et al. (2012) and assume that the scal authority
is provided with a \grace period" of exogenous length  during which it can repay the
bonds plus accumulated interest at the interest rate originally contracted on the debt. If it
repays within the grace period it returns to the nancial markets in good standing. If the
government fails to make full repayment within the grace period and defaults, it is punished
by permanent loss of access to international debt markets plus a loss of output given by the
19parameter . We continue to assume that it is not excluded from the union.
We construct a crisis equilibrium as follows. We rst consider the scal authority and
monetary authority's problem in the grace period when creditors refuse to roll over out-
standing debt. We compute the welfare of repaying the bonds within the grace period and
compare that to the welfare from outright default. This will allow us to determine whether
or not a rollover crisis is possible. We then dene the full problem of the scal and monetary
authorities under the threat of a roll over crisis and characterize the equilibria.
3.1 The Grace-Period Problem
In this subsection, we characterize the equilibrium response to a rollover crisis. We continue
our focus on symmetric equilibrium and thus characterize the problem for an individual
country with debt b and the remaining debtors having debt b. This will allow us to establish
the payos to an idiosyncratic deviation. Countries with 0 debt are by denition not subject
to roll-over crisis and with  = r their consumption c = y. We therefore focus on high-debt
countries. We re-normalize time to zero at the start of the grace period for convenience.
3.1.1 Fiscal authorities
When a scal authority is faced with a run on its debt it cannot issue new bonds to repay
maturing bonds. It has the option of repaying all debt within the grace period of length
 or defaulting. When making its decision the individual scal authority takes the policies
of the other scal authorities and the monetary authority as given. However the payo to
repayment depends on these other policies, which in turn depends on whether the other scal
authorities are themselves subject to a rollover crisis. To capture this dependence we index
the grace period problem for an individual scal authority by the aggregate policy function
^ (b;r;;t).
In the grace period problem, the government is obligated to repay the nominal balance
on or before date , with interest accruing over the grace period at the original contracted
rate r.16 In equilibrium, r = r(b;b) and r = r(b), but for now we treat r and r as arbitrary
primitives of the grace period problem.
We now state the problem of the scal authority with outstanding real debt b at interest
rate r when aggregate outstanding real debt is b and aggregate interest rate is r. Because a
scal authority takes ination as given, it will be useful to dene the value of repaying and
16As in Aguiar et al. (2012) we impose the pari passu condition that all bond holders have equal standing;
that is, the scal authority cannot default on a subset of bonds, while repaying the remaining bondholders.
Therefore, the relevant state variable is the entire stock of outstanding debt at the time the scal authority
enters the grace period.
20of default net of ination costs ^ V G, given by
^ V
G(b;b;r;r;; ^ ) = max
c(t)
 
0
e
 tu(c(t))dt + e
  ^ V (0); (7)
subject to
_ b(t) = c(t)   y + (r0   ^ (b;r;;t)b(t); (8)
b(0) = b; b() = 0; and _ b(t)   ^ (b;r;;t)b(t):
The term ^ V (0) in the objective function represents the equilibrium value of returning to
the markets with zero debt at the end of the grace period. The constraint
_ b(t)   ^ (b;r;t)b(t) imposes that no new nominal bonds be issued, that is _ B(t)  0.
The alternative to repayment is default. The value of default (net of ination costs) in
response to a rollover crisis is given by:
^ V =
u((1   )y)

:
We write CG(b;b;r;r;;t; ^ ) for the scal authority's consumption function.
The best response of the scal authority to a run on its debt is determined by ^ V G ? ^ V .
The value ^ V G(b;b;r;r;; ^ ) is decreasing in b and r. Note that the direct utility costs of
ination do not enter into the decision to default in a crisis. These costs are borne regardless
of the individual scal authority's decision. However, ination also enters into the budget
constraint (8). Higher ination relaxes this constraint making it easier for the scal authority
to repay its debt quickly. This is not oset by a higher (post-crisis) interest rate, as the scal
authority is not rolling over its debt at a new interest rate. Therefore, a scal authority facing
a crisis will nd repayment relatively attractive the more accommodating is monetary policy.
We now turn to the monetary authority's best response to a crisis.
3.1.2 Monetary authority
We now consider optimal monetary policy when the representative scal authority with debt
b0 faces a rollover crisis. In a symmetric equilibrium, all debtors will be subject to the same
crisis and choose the same response (default or repay). In selecting optimal monetary policy
during a rollover crisis, the monetary authority takes the crisis and response of the scal
authorities as given. If the scal authorities default, then the monetary authority simply
sets t = 0 for all t, as no member of the currency union holds debt after default. If the
representative scal authority does not default, the monetary authority's problem is:
21J
G(b;r;) = max
(t)2[0; ]
 
0
e
 t

u(C
G(b(t);b(t);r;r;   t;0; ~ 
G)) + (1   )u(y)    0(t)

dt
+
e 

J(0);
subject to
_ b(t) = C
G(b(t);b(t);r;r;   t;0; ~ 
G)   y + (r   (t))b(t); b(0) = b:
This yields an ination function G(b;r;;t). Equilibrium requires that ~ G(b;r;;t) =
G(b;r;;t), and as a result CG(b(t);b(t);r;r;   t;0;G) = CG(b;b;r;r;;t;G). The
reason we have introduced the notation ~ G(b;r;;t) is to make explicit which eects are or
are not a priori internalized by the monetary authority, which lacks commitment. In Ap-
pendix A, we examine whether there are in fact ineciencies arising from lack of commitment
or coordination between scal and monetary authorities in the grace period.
The value function JG(b;r;) is decreasing in b and r. We note that the objective func-
tion of the monetary authority and the scal authority dier because the former maximizes
aggregate welfare and recognizes that only a fraction  of countries have positive levels of
debt. Consequently the benets from inating are restricted to this  fraction of countries.
As we will see later, the problem of the monetary union with heterogeneity is isomorphic to
the problem with symmetric countries but with the monetary authority facing a perceived
cost of ination   =  0= that diers from  0. For a given (b;r), the monetary authority is
more likely to inate the larger the fraction of countries with positive debt, i.e. the higher
is .
3.2 Rollover Crises
Having characterized the equilibrium best response to a rollover crisis, we explore how runs
occur in equilibrium. To see how a run can be supported in equilibrium, consider an in-
dividual scal authority with debt b that faces a roll over crisis. Consider the problem of
an individual creditor when all other creditors refuse to purchase new bonds from the scal
authority, conditional on the aggregate state. If ^ V G < ^ V , then the best response of the
scal authorities to the rollover crisis is to default. An individual creditor that purchases
new bonds is not large enough to alter this decision and thus will receive zero in return for
any bonds it purchases. Thus, it is individually optimal for the creditor to also refuse to
purchase new bonds. On the other hand, if ^ V G  ^ V , bondholders receive the contracted
nominal payment and thus the scal authority's bonds would trade at a strictly positive
22price. A run can therefore be sustained in equilibrium at a given level of debt as long as the
scal authority's best response is to default.
While a run may be sustained at a particular level of debt, it is not the only equilibrium
outcome possible. Absent a run, the scal authority may be willing to service the debt
as usual, paying o maturing bonds by issuing new bonds. Moreover, as discussed in the
previous subsections, the response of an individual scal authority depends on whether
the other scal authorities are facing a crisis as well. To incorporate this multiplicity and
interdependence in a tractable manner, we extend the environment of Cole and Kehoe (2000),
which considers the case of a small open economy. Specically, part of the equilibrium will
be a region of the debt state space in which a scal authority is vulnerable to a rollover
crisis. Following Cole and Kehoe, we shall refer to this region as the crisis region. To
characterize a symmetric equilibrium, this region needs to be dened over two dimensions{
the idiosyncratic debt of a scal authority and the debt of the representative debtor. Also
following Cole and Kehoe (2000), we introduce a sunspot that coordinates creditor beliefs.
Specically, if (b;b) is in the crisis region of a scal authority with debt b, then with Poisson
arrival  creditors refuse to roll over maturing debt and the scal authority defaults. We hew
as closely as possible to the single-country case of Cole and Kehoe (2000) by considering a
simple threshold b, such that an individual debtor with debt b 2 
 is vulnerable to a crisis
if b > b for all b 2 
. We shall refer to the set fb 2 
jb > bg as the \crisis zone," and its
complement in 
 as the \safe zone."
3.2.1 Fiscal Authorities
We now state the problem of the government when not in default. We assume the government
faces a bond-market equilibrium characterized by an interest rate function r(b;b) dened on
a domain 

2
, an aggregate interest rate function r(b). The parameters dening the duration
of the grace period () and crisis arrival probability intensity () conditional on b > b are
taken as primitives of the environment.
Let T 2 (0;1] denote the rst time loans are called (i.e., a rollover crisis occurs). From
the scal authority's and an individual creditor's perspective, T is a random variable with a
distribution that depends on the path of the state variable. In particular,
Pr(T  ) = 1   e
 
 
0 1bt>bdt:
The realization of T is public information and it is the only uncertainty in the model.
Given that an individual country takes the monetary policy as given, it is helpful to
dene ^ V (b) to be the utility function without the ination costs for a country that has an
23amount of debt b. The government's problem can then be dened to be:
^ V (b) = max
c(t)
 1
0
e
 t 
 t
0 1fbs>bgdsu(c(t))dt (P3)
+
 1
0
e
 t 
 t
0 1fbs>bgds^ V dt
subject to
_ b(t) = c(t)   y + (r
? + 1fbt>bg)b(t); b(0) = b and b(t) 2 
:
where ^ V = u((1   )y)= (that is, the default value function excluding the ination
costs). Note, we have used that in equilibrium the nominal interest rate the government
faces is r? + 1fbt>bg + (t). It follows then that the real rate that the government faces at
any time t is independent of the government's choices at time t and equal to r? + 1fbt>bg.
The solution to this problem delivers a consumption function C(b).
3.2.2 Monetary Authority
The problem of the monetary authority is given by:
J(b) = max
(t)
 1
0
e
 t 
 t
0 1bs>bds (u(C(b(t)) + (1   )u(y)))dt (P4)
+
 1
0
e
 t 
 t
0 1bs>bdsV dt
 
 1
0
e
 t 0e
 
 t
0 1bs>bds(t)dt;
subject to
_ b(t) = C(b(t))   y + (r(b(t))   (t))b(t) and b(0) = b:
This generates an ination function (b).
3.3 Crisis Equilibrium
We now state the denition of equilibrium with crisis:
Denition 2. A Recursive Competitive Equilibrium with crisis species an aggregate inter-
est rate schedule r(b), an individual interest rate schedule r(b;b), a consumption function
C(b), an ination function (b), value functions ^ V (b) for a scal authority and J(b) for
the monetary authority, a value function (net of ination costs) for a scal authority in the
grace period ^ V G(b;b;r;r;t; ^ ), and nally a threshold b, such that:
24(i) ^ V (b) is the value function for the solution to the scal authority's problem and C(b) is
the maximizing policy function for consumption;
(ii) J(b) is the value functions for the solution to the monetary authority's problem and
(b) is the maximizing policy function for ination;
(iii) Bond holders earn a real return r; that is r(b;b) = r + (b) + 1b>b and r(b) =
r + (b) + 1b>b;
(iv) ^ V (b)  ^ V ;
(v) if b  b and b > b then ^ V G(b;b;r(b;b);r(b);;) < ^ V ; if b > b and b > b then
^ V G(b;0;r(b;b);r(b);;) < ^ V , where with a slight abuse of notation, we write ^  = 
for the equilibrium ination policy function with (b;r;t) given by (b;r;t) = (b(t))
where b(t) is dened by the following dierential equation _ b(t) = C(b(t)) y +(r(b) 
(b(t)))b(t) with b(0) = b.
Condition (v) stipulates that an individual country facing a rollover crisis prefers to
default when its debt b at the start of the crisis exceeds b regardless of what the debt
b of the representative debtor is at the start of the crisis. The ination policy chosen by
the monetary authority varies depending on whether the representative debtor country with
debt b is in the safe zone or in the crisis zone. If it is in the crisis zone ination policies
correspond to ination choices with b = 0 because the representative country defaults in the
crisis area.
The solution to the problem of the scal authority with positive debt level in the safe
zone is exactly the same as that of problem (P1) described in Section 2. The consumption
policy function is the steady state solution C(b) = y   b.
The solution to the problem of the monetary authority (P4) in the safe zone, is also the
same as the solution to problem (P2) in the no-crisis equilibria. The rst order condition for
ination as before requires comparing  0 to  J0(b)b where now:
  J
0(b) = u
0(y   b) +
 00(b)b

(9)
The cut o level of debt  b above which there will be high ination in the safe zone is
therefore determined by the condition:
u
0(y    b) b =
 0

(10)
25This equation follows intuitively. As the fraction of countries with positive debt increases the
monetary authority is more tempted to inate as it perceives more countries beneting from
the reduction in the real value of debt. In this sense as long as  < 1 there is a dierence
between the cost/benet of ination as perceived by the monetary authority  0= and the
private cost of ination  0.
3.4 Threshold for the safe zone
There are many recursive threshold equilibria corresponding to dierent thresholds b. We
now propose a particular equilibrium selection, which leads to a specic determination of
the threshold for the safe zone b. We then motivate our equilibrium selection.
Consider a recursive threshold equilibrium. Let ^ V G(b;b;r;r;; ^ ) be the value function
(net of ination costs) for a scal authority in the grace period, and let G(b;r;;t) be
the ination function for the monetary authority in the grace period when it satises the
consistency requirement G = ~ G. Dene b and b by:
Denition 3. Let
b  sup

b 
(1   e r?)y

   
^ V
G(b;b;r
 +  ;r
 +  ;;
G)  ^ V

;
b  sup

b 
(1   e r?)y
e  
   
^ V
G(b;b;r
;r
;;
G)  ^ V

:
These two thresholds correspond to the maximal debt the government is willing to repay
within the grace period if the interest rate is r? +   and r?, respectively. Note that we
have only to consider these two interest rates because we are rstly focusing on threshold
equilibria where ination takes the two value 0 or   and secondly because there is no rollover
crisis in equilibrium in the safe zone.
From the scal authority's problem described in Section 3.1, we have b < b. This
follows from the fact that ^ V G(b;b;r;r;;G) is strictly decreasing in r. The equilibrium
threshold for a rollover crisis b lies in 2 [b;b], the exact value within this interval being
determined by optimal ination.
We motivate our equilibrium selection as follows. In Appendix A, we show formally that
that in the grace period there is no scal externality. That is, if all countries are symmetric
and if scal and monetary decisions for all countries are delegated to a central authority,
then in the grace period, this authority would implement exactly the same allocation as that
reached in an equilibrium with independent scal authorities.
Despite the absence of the traditional scal externality in the grace period, there remains
26a \default externality." The default externality arises because there may be more than
one equilibrium best response from the monetary union. If the scal authorities default,
the monetary authority will not inate thus making repayment dicult. Conversely, an
alternative equilibrium response may exist in which scal authorities repay within the grace
period, aided by accommodative monetary policy.
While the default externality may be of interest in some contexts, it is not robust to a
straightforward coordination of beliefs among members of the monetary union. In Appendix
A, we show that if all countries are symmetric and if default, scal and monetary decisions
for all countries are delegated to a central authority, then faced with a rollover crisis, the
allocation implemented by this authority can also be reached in an equilibrium when default
and scal decisions are made by independent scal authorities. That is, the monetary union
can achieve the single-decision-maker outcome in the symmetric equilibrium by coordinating
beliefs on the preferable equilibrium response.17
Our equilibrium selection imposes the requirement that if there exists an equilibrium
best response in which the monetary authority comes to the rescue of the scal authorities
in a crisis by generating high ination, the scal authorities proceed as if they will be
rescued. This selection is appealing given the plausibility that beliefs within the union can
be coordinated in this way.
Given this requirement, our equilibrium is the monotone threshold equilibrium with the
largest possible crisis zone, i.e. the lowest possible value of b.18
3.5 Crisis vulnerability and the composition of debt
In this section we determine how the threshold for the safe zone b varies with the fraction
of countries with positive debt . In our environment we can perform this analysis without
solving the problem of the crisis zone.
In gure 3 we graph the thresholds b, b and  b as a function of 1=. From the problem
of the monetary authority in the grace period, Section 3.1.2, we have that the monetary
authority is more likely to inate the higher is . ^ V G(b;b;r;r;;G) excludes the direct cost
of ination (as scal authorities ignore the impact of their decisions on ination) but includes
the indirect benet that arises from higher consumption when debt is inated away. Since
the monetary authority is more likely to inate the higher is  we have ^ V G(b;b;r;r;;G)
17Note that this is very dierent than the scal externality in section 2.3. In that case, there was not a
consistent set of equilibrium beliefs that resolved the scal externality. Indeed, this result stems from the
fact that there is no scal externality in the grace period as the interest rate on debt in arrears is constant.
18In the safe zone a unique monotone threshold equilibrium will always exist. However, as we discuss
below for some values of  0 monotone threshold equilibria may not exist in the region where crisis is an
equilibrium possibility.
27(weakly) increasing in  and accordingly b and b are weakly decreasing in  1. As drawn
in gure 3 there is a at segment initially which allows for the possibility that for a range of
very low  1 the monetary authority chooses to inate to the maximal level and therefore
^ V G is independent of  over this range. The ination threshold  b is increasing in  1, which
follows straightforwardly from equation (10).
This implies that the relevant threshold for the crisis zone is bλ. When η
−1
1 < η−1 < η
−1
2 ,
bπ ∈ [bλ, bλ] and therefore the jump in inﬂation triggers a crisis and the crisis threshold bλ
tracks bπ. To the right of η
−1
2 a crisis is triggered even when inﬂation is low and accordingly
bλ tracks bλ. The crisis threshold evolves non-monotonically with η−1.
bλ
bλ
bπ
η−1
bλ
η
−1
1 η
−1
2
Figure 3: Crisis threshold and debt composition
When there are a large number of debtor countries, very low η−1, the monetary authority
inﬂates all the time, both in tranquil times and in response to a roll-over crisis. Since all of
the inﬂation is priced into interest rates there is no gain from inﬂating in crisis times. At
the other extreme, when η−1 is very high, there are so few countries with positive debt that
the monetary authority never inﬂates, neither in tranquil times nor in response to a crisis.
For intermediate levels of debtor nations and therefore intermediate levels of aggregate debt
the monetary authority is able to keep inﬂation low in tranquil times and therefore interest
rates are low in tranquil times and have surprise inﬂation in response to a crisis. This ability
to generate surprise inﬂation reduces the real value of debt the country with positive debt
owes and increases the region of debt over which there is no rollover crisis.
A more colorful presentation of this idea would be as follows: Suppose we refer to countries
with zero debt as “Germany” and countries with positive debt as “Greece”, for certain levels
of debt b, being in a union with lesser “Germany” can eliminate its exposure to roll-over
risk, as compared to a union with all “Germany”.
In Section 4 we analytically characterize the full solution to the crisis problem.
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Figure 3: Crisis threshold and debt composition
In the range  1 < 
 1
1 , b > b, that is ination jumps from 0 to   in the safe zone.
This implies that the relevant threshold for the crisis zone is b. When 
 1
1 <  1 < 
 1
2 ,
b 2 [b, b] and therefore the jump in ination triggers a crisis and the crisis threshold b
tracks b. To the right of 
 1
2 a crisis is triggered even when ination is low and accordingly
b tracks b. The crisis threshold evolves non-monotonically with  1.
When there are a large number of debtor countries, very low  1, the monetary authority
inates all the time, both in tranquil times and in response to a roll-over crisis. Since all of
the ination is priced into interest rates there is no gain from inating in crisis times. At
the other extreme, when  1 is very high, there are so few countries with positive debt that
the monetary authority never inates, neither in tranquil times nor in response to a crisis.
For intermediate levels of debtor nations and therefore intermediate levels of aggregate debt
the monetary authority is able to keep ination low in tranquil times and therefore interest
rates are low in tranquil times and have surprise ination in response to a crisis. This ability
to generate surprise ination reduces the real value of debt the country with positive debt
owes and increases the region of debt over which there is no rollover crisis.
In Section 4 we analytically characterize the full solution to the crisis problem.
284 Full Solution for Crisis Equilibria
4.1 Fiscal Authorities
We have already described the solution to the problem of the scal authority in the safe
zone. In this section we turn to the solution over the entire domain of debt, including the
crisis region, which is dened by the threshold b. The scal authority's value given its
idiosyncratic debt as well as union-wide debt is V (b;b). However, aggregate debt only enters
the scal authority's problem due to the ination costs, which is additively separable and {
from the perspective of the scal authority { independent of scal policy. We can therefore
consider the scal authority's problem net of ination costs. This net value is denoted
^ V (b). Note that this separability also exploits the fact that the crisis threshold faced by an
idiosyncratic scal authority, b, is independent of aggregate debt.
At points of dierentiability b > b of the value function, the HJB of the planning
problem is:
( + )^ V (b) = max
c
u(c) + ^ V
0(b)[( + )b + c   y] + ^ V :
The rst-order condition for consumption and the envelope condition are simply
u
0(c) =  ^ V
0(b);
^ V
00(b)[( + )b + c   y] = 0:
We continue to assume  = r, however it is no longer the case that the solution for
the scal authority in the crisis zone for all levels of debt is the stationary solution. This is
because while scal authorities do not internalize the eect of their decisions on ination,
they do internalize the eect of their debt choices on the individual interest rate they face
as it depends on the country's default probability. The stationary level of consumption in
the crisis zone will be C(b) = y   ( + )b and consequently the stationary solution for
^ V = u(y   ( + )b)=( + ). This ^ V is discontinuously lower to the right of b, the crisis
threshold, when compared to the ^ V = u(y   b)= in the safe zone. Just as in Cole and
Kehoe (2000), the scal authority therefore has an incentive to save to the right of b so as
to exit the crisis zone, trading o lower consumption in the transition for higher steady state
consumption. There is an optimal level of debt bmax > b > b such that for b > b the scal
authority prefers the stationary solution, the \staying zone", as it is too costly in terms of
foregone consumption to save out of the crisis zone.
Over the \saving zone" we have ( + )b + c   y < 0. Satisfying the envelope condition
requires that ^ V 00(b) = 0, that is the value function is linear over the range of debt where the
29country saves. As a result ^ V 0(b) and consumption u0(c) =  ^ V 0(b) are constant. The solution
for the constant consumption in the saving zone, C(b) is determined by value matching
using the HJB at b. Smooth pasting at b imposes that this constant consumption level
C(b) = y   ( + )b.
The equilibrium solution for consumption, given the crisis threshold b is then given by:
C(b) =
8
> <
> :
y   b if b  b;
C(b) if b < b < b;
y   ( + )b if b  b  bmax;
where C(b) is dened implicitly by
u(y   b)

 
u(C(b))
 + 
 

 + 
u(y)

+ u
0(C(b))
C(b)   y + ( + )b
 + 
= 0;
and b by C(b) = y  (+)b. Note that the consumption policy function depends on 
through its impact on the equilibrium determination of b.
As a technical aside, we have characterized the scal authority's problem as the solution
to the HJB where dierentiable. Note that the scal authority's optimal consumption policy
involves a discontinuity at b. This reects the desire to save out of the crisis region. Once
the safe region is reached, consumption jumps to the stationary-debt level. From the rst
order condition, u0(c) =  ^ V 0(b), this discrete jump in consumption implies that b is a point
of non-dierentiability. While the HJB cannot hold in the classical sense at this point, it
does satisfy the conditions for a \viscosity" solution, which is the appropriate generalized
solution.19
4.2 Monetary Authority
Having already described the solution for the problem of the monetary authority in the safe
zone, we evaluate the problem in the crisis zone. The HJB for the monetary authority in
the crisis zone, where dierentiable is given by:
( + )J(b) = max
2[0; ]
u(C(b)) + (1   )u(y)    0 + J
0(b)[(r(b)   )b + C(b)   y] + V :
19See Aguiar et al. (2012) for a discussion of viscosity solutions in a related context.
30The rst order condition and envelope condition are given by:
(b) =
8
<
:
0 if  0=   J0(b)b;
  if  0= <  J0(b)b:
J
0(b)
0(b)b + J
00(b)(( + )b + C(b)   y) = 0: (11)
The full solution will depend on the value of  that in turn determines whether the jump
in ination takes place in the safe zone or the crisis zone. As a counterpart to  b, which is
the debt threshold above which the monetary authority chooses high ination when faced
with the interest rate , dene ~ b as the maximum debt threshold above which the monetary
authority will choose high ination when faced with the interest rate +. The equilibrium
ination threshold is denoted by b.
Before providing the full analytical characterization of the solution for dierent values of
 in section 5.1, we describe using an example the circumstances under which a high-debt
country can be better o in a monetary union with an appropriate number of high debtors
than one with only low-debt countries. This relates to the discussion in the introduction
about optimal currency areas in the presence of self-fullling crises.
5 Optimal composition of a currency union
In the case without self-fullling crises a country with high debt is strictly better o when
every other member has low debt, ( = 0) as discussed in Section 2. This composition of the
currency union endogenously lowers the benet of ination for the monetary authority thus
enabling it to deliver the commitment outcome of zero ination. However, this conclusion
changes when countries are exposed to roll-over risk. In this case a country with high debt
may be better o when there is an appropriate measure of high debtors, i.e.  is suciently
greater than zero, as it can lower the vulnerability of the country to self-fullling crises, if
that pushes the central bank to inate in response to a roll-over crisis but not in tranquil
times.
To illustrate this, consider a currency union where every country has low debt i.e.  = 0.
In this case the perceived cost of ination,  0= goes to innity and the monetary authority
never inates, neither in tranquil times nor in crisis times. Dene b1 as the crisis threshold
in this case. Now consider increasing the fraction  in the currency union such that it leads
to an increase in b (as shown earlier) to b2 with the jump in ination occurring to the
31right of b2. A comparison of the two cases demonstrates that a country with a debt level
b1 < b < b2 is necessarily better o joining the currency union with a few high debtors
(the second case), than in a currency union with only low debtors ( = 0). The two value
functions are depicted in gure 4. The argument is simple. The value functions at b1 are
equal and the slope  u0(C(b1)) of the value function with  = 0 is strictly more negative
than the slope u0(y   b1) with  > 0 since C(b1) < y   b1.
There is therefore a range of high-debt over which welfare is higher for a high-debt member
in a monetary union with a larger number of high-debt members than with too few high
debt members. When  is high the monetary authority is credibly able to keep ination low
in tranquil times but inate in response to a crisis. This greater use of ination in the grace
period increases the size of the safe zone and increases the welfare of the country. Given our
assumption on ination costs, low-debt members are not worse o following the increase in
 because ination happens o-equilibrium.20
changes when countries are exposed to roll-over risk. In this case a country with high debt
may be better oﬀ when there is an appropriate measure of high debtors, i.e. η is suﬃciently
greater than zero, as it can lower the vulnerability of the country to self-fulﬁlling crises, if
that pushes the central bank to inﬂate in response to a roll-over crisis but not in tranquil
times.
To illustrate this, consider the case where every country is has low debt i.e. η = 0. In
this case the perceived cost of inﬂation, ψ0/η goes to inﬁnity and the monetary authority
never inﬂates, neither in tranquil times nor in crisis times. Deﬁne bλ1 as the crisis threshold
in this case. Now consider increasing the fraction η in the currency union such that it leads
to an increase in bλ (as shown earlier) to bλ2 with the jump in inﬂation occurring to the right
of bλ2. In this case the country with a debt level bλ1 < b < bλ2 is necessarily better oﬀ in
the currency union with a few high debtors (η > 0), than in a currency union with only low
debtors. The two value functions are depicted in ﬁgure 5. The argument is simple. The
value functions at bλ1 are equal and the slope −u0(Cλ(bλ1)) of the value function with η = 0
is strictly more negative than that u0(y − ρbλ1) with η > 0 since Cλ(bλ1) < y − ρbλ1.
There is therefore a range of high-debt over which welfare is higher for a high-debt member
in a monetary union with a larger number of high-debt members than with too few high
debt members. When η is high the monetary authority is credibly able to keep inﬂation low
in tranquil times but inﬂate in response to a crisis. This greater use of inﬂation in the grace
period increases the size of the safe zone and increases the welfare of the country. Given our
assumption on inﬂation costs, low-debt members are not worse oﬀ following the increase in
η because inﬂation happens oﬀ-equilibrium.18
V
V (b,b)
bλ1 bλ2
Figure 4: Welfare and debt composition
18 Alternative cost speciﬁcations might lead to an increase in the equilibrium inﬂation level, but the point
that the impact on the crisis threshold depends on oﬀ-equilibrium inﬂation remains.
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Figure 4: Welfare and debt composition
We now describe analytically the dierent possible congurations of equilibrium thresh-
olds and their implications for welfare.
5.1 Cases
Case 1:  b < b
This is the case when the fraction of countries with positive debt is so high that the jump
in ination takes place in the safe zone. The solution is depicted in gure 5.
20 Alternative cost specications might lead to an increase in the equilibrium ination level, but the point
that the impact on the crisis threshold depends on o-equilibrium ination remains.
32(i) Consumption policy function:
C(b) =
8
> <
> :
u(y   b) if b  b;
C(b) if b < b < b;
u(y   b) if b  b  bmax:
(ii) Ination policy function:
(b) =
8
<
:
0 if b   b;
  if  b < b  bmax:
(iii) Interest rate schedule:
r(b) =
8
> <
> :
 if b   b;
 +   if  b < b  b;
 +   +  if b < b  bmax:
(iv) Value functions:
V (b) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
u(y b)
 if b   b;
u(y b)  0 
 if  b < b  b;
V (b)   u0(C(b))(b   b) if b < b  b;
u(y (+)b)  0 
+ + 
+V if b < b  bmax:
Case 2:  b < ~ b < b This is the case when the jump in ination takes place within the
saving zone. In this case a monotone threshold equilibrium may not exist for certain values
of  as we discuss below. When it exists, the solution is as described below and depicted in
gure 6.
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Figure 6: Solution in the case when ¯ bπ < bλ
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Figure 5: Solution in the case when  b < b
34(i) Consumption policy function:
C(b) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
u(y   b) if b   b;
C( b) if  b < b < b;
u(y   b) if b  b  bmax:
(ii) Ination policy function:
(b) =
8
<
:
0 if b  ~ b;
  if ~ b < b  bmax:
(iii) Interest rate schedule:
r(b) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
 if b   b;
 +  if  b < b  ~ b;
 +   +  if ~ b < b  bmax:
(iv) Value functions:
V (b) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
u(y b)
 if b   b;
V ( b)   u0(C( b))(b    b) if  b < b  ~ b;
V (~ b)   [u0(C( b)) +
 0
(+)(b ~ b)](b   ~ b) if ~ b < b  b;
(u(y (+)b)  0 )
+ + 
+V if b < b  bmax:
The value function in this solution has a concave kink at ~ b and a convex kink at b. To
ensure that a monotone threshold equilibrium exists, that is ination does not jump down
to the right of b, we require that the following condition holds: u0(C( b))b    0  0.21
Case 3: b < b < ~ b < bmax
This is the case when the jump in ination takes place within the staying zone. The
21We can prove that [u0(C( b))b +
 0
(+)(1 
~ b)
b
]    0  0 is satised, but this is not sucient. As
~ b ! b, the second term can get large.
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Figure 7: Solution in the case when ¯ bλ < ˜ bπ < b∗
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Figure 6: Solution in the case when  b < ~ b < b
solution described below is depicted in gure 7.
36(i) Consumption policy function:
C(b) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
u(y   b) if b   b;
C(b) if  b < b < b;
u(y   b) if b  b  bmax:
(ii) Ination policy function:
(b) =
8
<
:
0 if b  ~ b;
  if ~ b < b  bmax;
(iii) Interest rate schedule:
r(b) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
 if b   b;
 +  if  b < b  ~ b;
 +   +  if ~ b < b  bmax:
(iv) Value functions:
V (b) =
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
u(y b)
 if b   b;
V ( b)   u0(C( b))(b    b) if  b < b  b;
u(y (+)b
+ + 
+V if b < b  ~ b;
u(y (+)b)  0 
+ + 
+V if ~ b < b  bmax:
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Figure 8: Solution in the case when b∗ < ¯ bπ < bmax
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Figure 7: Solution in the case when b <  b < bmax
386 Conclusion
The ongoing euro zone crisis has brought to the fore front the inherent tensions in a monetary
union where individual countries have control over scal decisions but where monetary deci-
sions are made by a union wide monetary authority that maximizes welfare of the union as a
whole. It is a familiar argument that individual countries in a union are worse o when there
is limited synchronization in business cycles across countries, as a common monetary policy
for the union can be inconsistent with the needs of dierent countries. Here we highlight
another tension that arises when countries are subject to roll-over risk in debt markets.
The monetary authority may be able to use surprise ination to reduce the real value of
debt owed and thus eliminate a roll-over crisis. Whether it will choose to do so and whether
it can eectively do so depends on the aggregate level of debt in the union. If the aggregate
level of debt in the union is low the monetary authority will choose never to inate, neither
in tranquil nor in crisis time. At the other extreme, if the aggregate debt in the union is
high, the monetary authority uses ination all the time and consequently fails to generate
surprise ination. On the other hand when there is an intermediate level of aggregate debt
the monetary authority chooses low ination in normal times and high ination in crisis
times, thus generating surprise ination and helps prevent a roll-over crisis. An indebted
country in the union therefore gets no help from the monetary authority in preventing self-
fullling crises when everyone else in the union is as indebted as it is or when no one in the
union is like it. A \Greece" is better o in a monetary union with some \Germany", but
not all \Germany". This composition gives \Greece" both low ination and eliminates its
exposure to self-fullling crisis. Importantly, this can take place without any loss of welfare
to \Germany" if the use of ination is done o-equilibrium.22
Clearly, debt crises disappear when a country's debt is low enough. However, we demon-
strate the existence of a scal externality that limits individual countries incentive to reduce
their debt. This arises because they fail to internalize the impact of their debt on the union
monetary authorities incentive to inate. Consequently they end up with higher debt than
if they were an independent country with control over both scal and monetary policy.
22We have described an environment where the debt of members of the union are held outside the union.
In reality, as in the case of the euro zone, a signicant fraction of the debt is held by members of the union.
In our environment this would have similar eects to reducing  and therefore the incentive to inate.
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41A Fiscal and Default Externalities in Rollover Crises
The motivation for our equilibrium selection in Section 3:4 is that in response to a rollover
crisis, the optimal coordinated scal and monetary policies are a symmetric equilibrium best
response. In this section, we formalize this arguments. We break it down into two related
results. First we establish that in the grace period problem, the optimal coordinated scal
and monetary policies are a symmetric equilibrium best response. Second we establish that
in response to a rollover crisis, the optimal coordinated default, scal and monetary policies
are a symmetric equilibrium best response.
We start by showing that there is no scal externality in the grace period. To see this
formally, it is useful to consider the best response to a grace period when monetary and scal
policies are chosen by the same decision maker during the grace period. This is the scenario
of the small open economy considered in section 2.3:
V
G
E (b;r;) = max
f(t)2[0; ];c(t)g
 
0
e
 t(u(c(t)) + (1   )u(y)    0(t))dt + e
 u(y)

; (12)
subject to
_ b(t) = c(t) + (r   (t))b(t)   y
b(0) = b; b() = 0;
where as before r is the contracted interest rate at the start of the crisis (which is the
equilibrium rate of the decentralized monetary union). For this problem, consumption and
ination are coordinated. We have the following result.
Result 1. When the representative country is in the grace period, the optimal coordinated
scal and monetary policies are the only symmetric equilibrium best response.
This follows from the discussion of scal externalities in Section 2.3. Fiscal externalities
arise because scal authorities fail to internalize the impact of their debt choices on the
interest rates they face through its impact on ination. In the grace period, the nominal
interest rate r is xed at r0, independent of the level of aggregate debt b(t). As a result,
scal authorities correctly internalize all the eects of their debt decisions. In other words,
there is no scal externality.
Despite the absence of the traditional scal externality in the grace period, there remains
a \default externality." The default externality arises because there may be more than
one equilibrium best response from the monetary union. If the scal authorities default,
the monetary authority will not inate thus making repayment dicult. Conversely, an
42alternative equilibrium response may exist in which scal authorities repay within the grace
period, aided by accommodative monetary policy.
While the default externality may be of interest in some contexts, it is not robust to a
straightforward coordination of beliefs among members of the monetary union. To see this
formally, consider the best response to a rollover crisis when monetary and scal policies
are chosen by the same decision maker. The unied decision maker can decide to repay, in
which case optimal monetary and scal policies are determined as above in equation (12).
The unied decision maker can also choose default and receive ^ V E = 
u((1 )y)
 +(1 )
u(y)
 .
The coordinated best response leads to a value VE(b;r;) = max
n
V G
E (b;r;); ^ V E
o
. We
have the following result.
Result 2. When the representative country is subject to a rollover crisis, the optimal coor-
dinated default, scal and monetary policies are a symmetric equilibrium best response.
This result shows that the default externality is not robust to simple coordination.
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